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Abstract
This paper develops a general equilibrium endogenous growth model
that emphasizes the mechanisms, other than market size, through which
trade-induced North-South technological knowledge diﬀusion inﬂuences
the direction of technological progress and, thus, the path of intra and
inter-country wage inequality. In contrast with the market-size eﬀect,
more common in previous literature on skill-biased technological change,
the operation of the price channel, central to this paper, predicts an in-
creasing high-skilled technological bias following openness, which is more
in line with the recent trends observed in developed and developing coun-
tries.
Keywords: North-South trade; Technological knowledge diﬀusion; Di-
rection of technological progress; Wage inequality.
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This paper aims at improving our understanding of how North-South diﬀusion
of technological knowledge, through international trade, inﬂuences the direction
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1of technological knowledge and wage inequality. We develop a dynamic general
equilibrium model of endogenous growth, following and contributing to two main
lines of research previously explored, notably, by: (i) technological knowledge
diﬀusion growth models of Grossman and Helpman (1991a, chs. 11-12) and
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997); and (ii) direction of technological change and
wage inequality growth models of Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) and Acemoglu
(2002).
Recent interpretations of trends in intra-country wage inequality provide the
main motivation for this research. Richardson (1995), among others, emphasizes
two major trends, since the early 1980s, regarding low versus high-skilled wage
inequality in developed and (newly-industrialized) developing countries: rise in
wage inequality in favor of high-skilled labor; and rise in the proportion of high-
skilled labor. These trends are concomitant with strong technological progress
and enlarged trade ﬂows between those countries.
Analyzing recent literature, one concludes that each major explanation ex-
plored to date contradicts at least one of these observed trends. Following Wood
(1998), the mechanisms behind these explanations are grouped in two categories:
technology and trade.
According to the technology approach, prominently explored by Acemoglu
(e.g., 1998 and 2002), the direction of technological change and the resulting
path of the wage premium are driven by the rise in high-skilled labor sup-
ply. Thus, this explanation emphasizes the market-size eﬀect on technological
progress; but the operation of this very same eﬀect with trade openness par-
tially contradicts the argument — with an increase in trade between a high-skilled
abundant country and a less-skilled one, the market-size channel would predict
a reduction in the high-skilled technological bias.
As to the trade mechanism, adopted, e.g., by Leamer (1996) and Wood
(1998), the explanation relies mainly on the application of the Stolper-Samuelson
theorem: imports of goods produced by less-skilled labor reduce less-skilled
wages in the high-skilled abundant country However, the same argument ap-
plied to the exporter-country would predict a rise in the less-skilled wage pre-
mium, which contradicts the trend in developing countries.
By shifting to the price channel (instead of the market size) and by account-
ing for technological knowledge diﬀusion, which we deem as non-dissociable
from trade, we propose a framework capable of generating predictions com-
patible with the trend, described above, of wage inequality in developed and
developing countries. Apart from the endogenous growth debate on scale ef-
2fects (see, e.g., Jones, 1995a, b; Dinopoulos and Thompson, 1998; and Howitt,
1999) our removal of the market-size channel is mainly an instrument to isolate
the price mechanisms of technological knowledge diﬀusion through international
trade.
Our stylized North (developed) and South (developing) countries diﬀer in
levels of productivity, labor endowments and R&D capacity. These diﬀerences
are assumed to have historical roots that are reﬂected in current institutional
characteristics. Our main concern is not to explain these diﬀerences, but rather
to take them as given at time zero and analyze the subsequent path of both
economies under international trade. The North is more productive than the
South due to domestic institutions, is endowed with a higher initial level of the
more productive labor, and its R&D activities result in innovations that improve
the quality of products — Schumpeterian R&D, as formalized by Aghion and
Howitt (1992). The South has a marginal cost advantage in the production of
goods, and also conducts R&D, but its best results are imitations of the North’s
innovations — as in Grossman and Helpman (1991, chs. 11 and 12). Since we
want to focus on technological diﬀusion through trade of intermediate goods,
it is reasonable to consider that the South is not too backward relative to the
developed North. The degree of backwardness is included by making the South’s
imitation of existing technology conditional to the distance to the technological
frontier, in the sense that there is a threshold distance beyond which the cost
of imitation is higher than the cost of re-inventing older product qualities.
Additional features of our model relate the technology of production, in both
the North and South, to the structure of international trade. Each economy
produces ﬁnal goods with labor and intermediate goods, where R&D is directly
applied. We focus on international trade of intermediate goods, since it is most
relevant for technological knowledge diﬀusion. As for the production of (non-
traded) ﬁnal goods, the crucial feature is the concurrence of complementarity
in the use of inputs and substitutability between types of technology, following
Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001).
After these introductory remarks, the paper proceeds to characterize the
North and South economies in section 2. Then, in section 3, international trade
in intermediate goods is introduced and its level, steady-state and transitional
dynamics eﬀects derived. Section 4 concludes the paper with an assessment of
the current state of this research.
32 Modeling the domestic economy
We characterize the North economy and, in the process, highlight the diﬀerences
with the South. The economy is composed of two sectors: producers of ﬁnal
goods and producers of intermediate goods. The R&D activities are directly
connected to the intermediate-goods sector, where competitive monopolists use
the innovative blueprints as inputs, as in Romer (1990).
2.1 Final-goods technology
Final goods — Y , continuously indexed by n ∈ [0,1] — are produced in perfect
competition. Following the Schumpeterian set-up2 complemented with the re-
cent contribution of Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001), we consider that each ﬁnal
good is producible by two technologies, Low and High. The Low-technology uses
low-skilled labor, L, complemented with a continuum of Low-speciﬁci n t e r m e -
diate goods indexed by j ∈ [0,J]. The High-technology’s inputs are high-skilled
labor, H, complemented with a continuum of High-speciﬁci n t e r m e d i a t eg o o d s
indexed by j ∈ [J,1]. That is, each set of intermediate goods complements
























The ﬁrst and third expressions within square brackets sum up the contri-
butions of the two types of intermediate goods to production, while the second
and fourth represent the role of the speciﬁc labor inputs. Parameter α ∈ ]0,1[
is the labor share in production. The term A is a positive exogenous variable
representing the level of productivity, dependent on the country’s domestic in-
stitutions (i.e., non-international trade related), namely property rights, tax
laws and government services. Indexing the South by S a n dt h eN o r t hb yN,
we consider AS <A N as the only North-South diﬀerence in the parameters of
the production function of ﬁnal goods.
The labor terms include the quantities employed in the production of the
nth ﬁnal good — Ln and Hn — and two types of corrective factors accounting for
2As amply divulged by the textbooks of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) and Aghion and
Howitt (1998).
4productivity diﬀerentials. An absolute productivity advantage of high-skilled
over low-skilled labor is accounted for by the parameter h,a s s u m i n gh > 1;
i.e., assuming a technological bias in favour of the High-technology. A relative
productivity advantage of either type of labor is captured by the terms n and
(1 − n). The use of these adjustment terms transforms the ﬁnal-goods index n
into a relevant ordering index: meaning that high-skilled labor is relatively more
productive in producing ﬁnal goods indexed by larger ns, and vice-versa.S i n c e
n ∈ [0,1], there is a threshold ﬁnal good n, endogenously determined, where the
switch from one technology to another becomes advantageous, as will become
clear below. In this sense, n deﬁnes the structure of ﬁnal-goods production.
Each of the two intermediate-goods terms includes an adjustment for qual-
ity that reﬂects a stylized technological change process of the quality ladder
type. The size of each quality upgrade obtained with each successful research is
denoted by q, an exogenously determined constant greater than 1.T h e r u n g s
of the quality ladder are indexed by k,w i t hh i g h e rks denoting higher quality.
At time 0, the highest quality good in each intermediate-goods industry has a
quality index k =0 .A tt i m et the highest quality good produced by industry j
has a quality index k(j,t).T h eq u a n t i t yxn(k,j,t) of the quality rung k of the





is the quality-adjusted total amount of the intermediate good j,a n d(1 − α) is
its share in the ﬁnal-good production.
Because of proﬁt maximizing limit pricing by the monopolist producers of
intermediate goods, only the highest quality available of each intermediate good
is actually used, so that the quality-adjusted amount (2) becomes
qk(j,t) xn(k,j,t).( 3 )
Taking this into account, the zero proﬁt equilibrium of the (constant returns
to scale perfectly competitive) producers of ﬁnal goods yields the demand for
each intermediate good (highest quality only) by the representative producer of
nth ﬁnal good,
xn(k,j,t)=( 1− n) Ln
·







α ],i f0 <j≤ J ; (4a)
5xn(k,j,t)=nhH n
·







α ],i fJ<j≤ 1,( 4 b )
where pn(t) is the price of ﬁnal good n, p(j,t) is the price of intermediate good
j, and the numeraire is the composite ﬁnal good. All prices are given for the
perfectly competitive producers of ﬁnal goods.
Plugging equations (4a) and (4b) into the production function (1), and using






















α ] dj (6)
are the aggregate domestic quality indexes, measuring domestic technological
knowledge. The ratio
QH
QL is the relative productivity of the High technological
knowledge, which is an appropriate measure of the technological-knowledge bias.
Equation (5) clearly shows how growth of ﬁnal production is driven by growth
of technological knowledge.












Since, by assumption, the production of intermediate goods and R&D are ﬁ-
nanced by the resources saved after consumption of the composite ﬁnal good,
the simplest hypothesis is to consider that the production function of interme-
diate goods is identical to the composite ﬁnal good speciﬁed by equations (7)
and (1).3 Given this convenient simpliﬁcation, the marginal cost, MC, of pro-
ducing an intermediate good equals the MC of producing the composite ﬁnal
good, which, due to perfect competition in the ﬁnal-goods sector, equals the
price of the composite ﬁn a lg o o d( n u m e r a i r e ) ;i ns h o r t ,MC =1 .T h u s , t h e
MC of producing an intermediate good is independent of its quality level and
is identical across all domestic industries.
3Or, equivalently, that the composite ﬁnal good is the input in the production of each
intermediate good, as in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997), for example.
6The manufacture of an intermediate good requires a start-up cost of R&D
in a new design. This investment in a blueprint can only be recovered if prof-
its are positive within a certain period in the future. This is guaranteed by
domestically enforced patents — i.e., there is a domestic system of intellectual
property rights (IPRs) —, which protect the leader ﬁrm’s domestic monopoly of
that quality good, while at the same time disseminating acquired knowledge to
other domestic ﬁrms. Under these assumptions, knowledge of how to produce a
good is public (non-rival and non-excludable) within a country.






which is constant over time, across industries and for all quality grades. The
closer α is to zero, the smaller the mark-up — i.e., there is less room for monopoly
pricing.
Since the last innovator in each industry is the only ﬁrm legally allowed to
produce the highest quality intermediate good, it will use pricing to wipe out
sales of lower quality intermediate goods in its industry. Depending on whether
q(1 − α) is greater or less than MC =1 , the leader of each industry will,
respectively, use the monopoly pricing (8) or the limit pricing
p = q (9)
to capture the entire market (see, for example, Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004,
ch. 7). We assume, for example like Grossman and Helpman (1991a, ch. 4),
that limit pricing is binding.4
Since the lowest price that the closest follower can charge without negative
proﬁts is MC, the leader can successfully capture the entire market by selling at
a price slightly below qMC,b e c a u s eq is the quality advantage over the closest
follower. Therefore, the size of each quality improvement is also an indicator of
the market power of the incumbent ﬁrm in each intermediate-goods industry.
2.3 Equilibrium for given technological knowledge
It is now convenient to derive the domestic equilibrium of the economy, for given
technological knowledge deﬁned by (6). Then, the description of R&D activity
4In other words, we assume that quality improvements q a r en o tl a r g ee n o u g h( q ≤ 1
1−α),
to enable each leader to use monopoly pricing.
7closes the model of the domestic economy.
An important feature of the equilibrium is that only one technology, Low
or High — i.e., one combination of intermediate goods of a certain type and the
respective labor — is used to produce a particular ﬁnal good. The derivation of
this result follows, with the due diﬀerences, Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001).
The pattern of relative advantage embedded in the production function (1)
through the adjustment terms n and (1 − n) makes H relatively more produc-
tive in high index ﬁnal goods. Together with proﬁt maximization, this pattern
implies the existence of a threshold ﬁnal good n ∈ [0,1] such that only Low-
technology is used to produce ﬁnal goods indexed by n ≤ n, and only High-
technology is used to produce goods with n>n; i.e., in production function
(1),
Hn(t)=xn(k,j,t)=0 , where J<j≤ 1, ∀ 0 ≤ n ≤ n
Ln(t)=xn(k,j,t)=0 , where 0 ≤ j ≤ J, ∀ n ≤ n ≤ 1
. (10)
The determination of n follows from equilibrium in the factors markets, by
equalizing the marginal value product of each type of labor across the relevant
ﬁnal-goods industries — n ≤ n for L and n>n for H.T h e r e s u l t i n g n,a sa











where H and L are the exogenous levels of each type of labor, assumed to be
fully employed at each point in time.
It is useful to relate n to prices, as well. This is achieved by taking into
account that in the production of the threshold ﬁnal good n = n both a ﬁrm
that uses Low-technology and a ﬁrm that uses High-technology should break
even. This turns out to yield, at each moment in time, the following ratio of









where prices are, at each period t, conveniently indexed as
pn =
½
pL (1 − n)−α, ∀ 0 ≤ n ≤ n
pH n−α, ∀ n ≤ n ≤ 1
. (13)
Equation (11) shows that either if technological knowledge is highly biased
8— that is, high
QH
QL — or if there is a large relative supply of H, the fraction of
industries using the High-technology is large and so n is small. In terms of prices,
small n implies that the relative price of High-technology goods is also low and,
conversely, the relative price of Low-technology goods is high, as equation (12)
shows. In this situation, the demand for Low-speciﬁci n t e r m e d i a t eg o o d si sh i g h
— equations (4a) and (4b) —, increasing the demand for Low-speciﬁcn e wd e s i g n s
and inducing R&D activities aimed at improving Low-speciﬁc technologies. In
sum, the structure of labor endowments inﬂuences the direction of R&D through
the price (of ﬁnal goods) channel — i.e., there are stronger incentives to develop
technologies when the ﬁnal goods produced by these technologies command
higher prices.5
The equilibrium aggregate output at each time t —t h ec o m p o s i t eﬁnal good
from equation (7) — is expressible as a function of the currently given aggregate
domestic quality indexes,















Since wm(t) — the wage per unit of m-type labor, where m = H,L —i se q u a l















and the relative (to the North) high and low-skilled wages in the South (reﬂect-





















Since we are considering that the South is not too backward, it is predictable
that inter-country diﬀerences in prices of ﬁnal goods are of second order.6 Bear-
5This price channel shows up in various papers by Acemoglu (e.g., 2002), although always
dominated by the market-size eﬀect, which, in our case, is removed — see below the equilibrium
R&D in section 3.
6Inter-country diﬀerences in prices of ﬁnal goods depend on diﬀerences in the structure of
9ing this in mind, inspection of equations (16a) and (16b) shows that wages are
higher in the North, as a result of absolute advantage in exogenous productivity
— AN >A S — and in domestic technological knowledge — QH,N >Q H,S and
QL,N >Q L,S.
2.4 Consumers
A time-invariant number of heterogeneous individuals — continuously indexed by
i ∈ [0,1] — decide the allocation of income, which is partly spent on consumption
of the composite ﬁnal good, and partly lent in return for future interest. For
simplicity, we consider an exogenous threshold individual i, such that individuals
i>i are high-skilled workers, whereas individuals i ≤ i are low-skilled workers.
With a constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution (CIES) instanta-









where c(i,t) is individual consumption at time t, ρ>0 is the homogeneous
subjective discount rate and θ>0 is the constant elasticity of marginal utility
with respect to consumption.
The budget constraint of individual i equalizes income earned to consump-
tion plus savings, at each t. Savings consists of accumulation of ﬁnancial assets
— K,w i t hr e t u r nr — in the form of ownership of the ﬁrms that produce inter-
mediate goods in monopolistic competition. The value of these ﬁrms, in turn,
corresponds to the value of patents in use. The budget constraint, expressed as
savings = income + consumption, is
.




L, if i ≤ i
indexes the type of labor speciﬁc to the individual.
Each individual maximizes lifetime utility (17), subject to the budget con-
straint (18). The solution for the consumption path, which is independent of




[r(t) − ρ], (19)
ﬁnal goods production (i.e.,i nt h et h r e s h o l dﬁnal good n)a n do fl a b o re n d o w m e n t s .
10where b c is the growth rate of c.
2.5 R&D technology
R&D drives the North and South economic growth. A more detailed description
of the technology of R&D activities is thus in order, closing the characterization
of the North and South domestic economies.
The R&D activities in the North result in innovative designs for the man-
ufacture of intermediate goods, which increase their quality. The designs are
domestically patented and the leader ﬁrm in each intermediate-goods industry
— the one that produces according to the latest patent — uses limit pricing (9) to
assure monopoly. The value of the leading-edge patent depends on the proﬁt-
yields accruing during each period t to the monopolist, and on the duration of
the monopoly power. The duration, in turn, depends on the probability of a
new innovation, which creatively destroys the current leading-edge design — in
the lines of the Schumpeterian models introduced by Segerstrom et al. (1990)
and Aghion and Howitt (1992). The probability of a successful innovation is,
thus, at the heart of R&D.
Let pbN(k,j,t) denote the instantaneous probability at time t —aP o i s -
son arrival rate — of Northern successful innovation in the next higher quality
[k(j,t)+1 ]in intermediate-goods industry j,
pbN(k,j,t)=yN(k,j,t) · βN qk(j,t) · ζ
−1




(i) yN(k,j,t) is the ﬂow of domestic ﬁnal-good resources devoted to R&D in
intermediate good j, which deﬁnes our framework as a lab equipment model —
e.g., Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991);
(ii) βN qk(j,t), βN > 0, represents learning by past domestic R&D, as a
positive learning eﬀect of accumulated public knowledge from past successful
R&D — e.g., Grossman and Helpman (1991, ch. 12) and Connolly (2003);
(iii) ζ
−1
N q−α−1k(j,t), ζN > 0,i st h ea d v e r s ee ﬀect — cost of complexity —
caused by the increasing complexity of quality improvements — e.g.,K o r t u m
(1997) and Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2004);7
7This complexity cost is modelled in such a way that, together with the positive learning
eﬀect (ii), exactly oﬀsets the positive inﬂuence of the quality rung on the proﬁts of each leader
intermediate good ﬁrm — calculated below; this is the technical reason for the presence of the




N , mN = LN when 0 ≤ j ≤ J and mN = HN when J<j≤
1, ξN > 0,i st h ea d v e r s ee ﬀect of market size, capturing the idea that the
diﬃculty of introducing new quality intermediate goods and replacing old ones
is proportional to the size of the market measured by the respective labor. That
is, for reasons of simplicity, we reﬂect in R&D the costs of scale increasing, due to
coordination among agents, processing of ideas, informational, organizational,
marketing and transportation costs, as reported by works such as Becker and
Murphy (1992), Alesina and Spolaore (1997), Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999)
and Dinopoulos and Thompson (1999).8
The South mimics the R&D process of the North, but not necessarily at
the edge of technological progress. That is, the South’s R&D activities result
in imitation of current best qualities of lower rung qualities. Denoting the
probability of successful imitation by pbS(k,j,t) — the instantaneous probability
of successful imitation of the current higher quality k(j,t) in intermediate-goods
industry j,
pbS(k,j,t)=yS(k,j,t) · βS qkS(j,t) · ζ
−1
S q−α−1k(j,t) · m
−ξS
S ·
·BD(j,t) · BT(j,t) · f(e Qm(t),d)−σ+ e Qm(t) , (21)
where:
(i) yS(k,j,t) is the ﬂow of domestic ﬁnal-good resources devoted to R&D in
intermediate good j;
(ii) βS qkS(j,t), 0 <β S <β N, kS ≤ k; i.e., we consider that the learning by
past imitations is lower that the learning by past innovations;
(iii) ζ
−1
S q−α−1k(j,t), ζN >ζ P > 0; i.e.,w ea s s u m et h a tt h ec o m p l e x i t yc o s t




S , mS = LS when 0 ≤ j ≤ J and mS = HS when J<j≤ 1,
ξS > 0,i st h ea d v e r s ee ﬀect of market size;
(v) BT(j,t) · BD(j,t) · f(e Qm(t),d)−σ+ e Qm(t), 0 < e Qm(t) < 1, σ>0.T h i s
is a catching-up term, speciﬁc to the South, which sums up positive eﬀects of
imitation capacity and backwardness.
Further remarks on each term of the catching-up factor (21)-(v) are in order.
Terms BD(j,t) and BT(j,t) are positive exogenous variables, which capture
important determinants of imitation capacity. The former represents the level of
8Dinopoulos and Thompson (1999), in particular, provided micro foundations for this eﬀect
in a model of growth through variety accumulation.
12imitation productivity dependent on domestic causes, which includes domestic
policies promoting R&D — e.g.,A g h i o net al. (2001, 2004). The latter embodies
the level of imitation productivity dependent on external causes, and thus com-
prises the degree of openness to international trade — e.g., Coe and Helpman
(1995) and Coe et al. (1997) — and other trade policies, namely international
integration — e.g., Grossman and Helpman (1991, ch, 11), as well as the South’s
relative level of labor. Therefore, we assume that labor enhances the imitation
capacity, thereby speeding up convergence with the North — as argued by Nel-
son and Phelps (1966) and, more recently, by Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) and
Aghion et al. (2004), among others.
In order to capture the beneﬁts of relative backwardness, function f(e Qm(t),d)
— similar to Papageorgiou (2002) — is
f(e Qm(t),d)=
(
0 ,i f0 < e Qm(t) ≤ d
−e Qm(t)2 +( 1+d) e Qm(t) − d ,i fd< e Qm(t) < 1
, (22)
where e Qm(t) ≡
Qm,S(t)
Qm,N(t) is the relative technological knowledge level of the
South’s m-speciﬁci n t e r m e d i a t eg o o d s . 9
Provided that the gap is not large — i.e.,i fe Qm(t) is above threshold d —t h e n
the country can beneﬁt from an advantage of backwardness, as in Barro and
Sala-i-Martin (1997). When the gap is wider — so that e Qm(t) is below threshold
d — backwardness is no longer an advantage (in line with Verspagen, 1993, for
example).
Function f(e Qm(t),d) is quadratic over the range of main interest, and, once
aﬀected by the exponent function σ(.) in (21)-(v), yields an increasing (in the
technological knowledge gap) advantage of backwardness — where the size of σ
aﬀects how quickly the probability of successful imitation falls as the technolog-
ical knowledge gap falls.
9Thus, we assume that the probability of successful imitation in intermediate good j is
state dependent on all past successful research in all intermediate goods of its type in both
countries, contrary to the probability of successful innovation, which is state dependent only
on the stock of past successful research in intermediate good j in the North.
133 Technological knowledge dynamics with North-
South trade in intermediate goods
With the countries’ structure characterized, we now proceed to consider inter-
national trade of intermediate goods. In this context, the South has access
to the same technological knowledge as the North, either by imitation of the
latest innovations, or by importing state-of-the-art intermediate goods.10 This
improvement in the level of technological knowledge available to the South is
as t a t i cb e n e ﬁt of international trade, with immediate eﬀects on the levels of
productivity and prices of goods and factors. The dynamics — growth eﬀect —
involves the South as well as the North, due to interaction (feedback) between
the countries.
In balanced trade without international mobility of the other factors of pro-
duction and assets, the South, in order to import some intermediate goods,
has to be able to export other intermediate goods. Due to marginal cost ad-
vantages, the intermediate goods of which top-qualities are imitated become
South’s exports.
3.1 Worldwide limit pricing, intermediate-goods demand
and ﬁnal-goods supply
We must distinguish now between the composite ﬁnal good of the North deﬁned
by (7) and the Southern one, which is also deﬁned by integration over ﬁnal goods
and which we assume is produced at a lower marginal cost, MCS. Since under








where 0 <M C S <M C N =1(recall the intermediate-goods technology in
section 2 above).
Due to the simpliﬁcation in technology explained in section 2, this marginal
cost advantage is transmitted to the production of intermediate goods. This
inﬂuences worldwide optimizing limit pricing by the relevant competitive mo-
nopolists — e.g., Grossman and Helpman (1991, ch. 12). The three possible
10However, Southern technological knowledge, Qm,S, is not equalized with the North be-
cause at each point in time not all innovations have been imitated yet. Hence, it is useful to
keep in mind the distinction between (i) Southern technological knowledge and (ii) available
technological knowledge in the South, Qm,N.
14sequences of successful R&D outcomes and their limit pricing consequences at
time t,g i v e nq u a l i t yk at time t − dt, are depicted in table 1.


























Φm Ψm pm,N−S(j)=qM C S
Table 1: Limit pricing of each intermediate good
The ﬁrst mark-up is the one in equation (9) and is the highest — the Northern
entrant (N) competes with a Northern incumbent (N)a tt h es a m em a r g i n a lc o s t
but with better quality. The second one is smaller — the Southern entrant (S),
with lower marginal cost, competes in the same quality rung with a Northern
incumbent (N). Compared with the ﬁrst, the third mark-up is again smaller,
but due to a diﬀerent reason — the Northern entrant improves quality as in the
ﬁrst case, but competes with an incumbent with lower marginal cost.
In order to pin down which intermediate goods are produced in each country
at each moment in time, let
(i) Φm and (1−Φm) be the proportion of intermediate goods of m-type with
production in the North and in the South, respectively;
(ii) Ψm be the proportion of intermediate goods of m- t y p ep r o d u c e di nt h e
North having overcome imitator competition;
(iii) (1 − Ψm) be the proportion of intermediate goods of m-type produced
in the North having overcome innovator competition.11
11The speciﬁcation of these proportions as functions of the probabilities of successful R&D,
necessary for transitional dynamics, has been carried out (but not presented here) in such
a way that, as in Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2004), the proportion of intermediate goods
produced in the North increases with the probability of innovation and decreases with the
probability of imitation.
15We can now deﬁne a price index for the m-type intermediate goods — at each
moment in time — as a weighted average of the limit prices in table 1,
pm =1+Φm [q − 1] − Φm Ψm q (1 − MCP). (24)
3.2 Level eﬀects in the South
T h es t a t i ce ﬀect of international trade inﬂuencing the South is apparent in the











By allowing international access to the state-of-the-art intermediate goods,
international trade aﬀects the structure of ﬁnal-goods production in the South
— through the ratio
QH,N
QL,N . Since the technological knowledge gap is always
favorable to the North in either speciﬁck n o w l e d g e—i.e., Qm,N >Q m,S —, the
South enjoys an immediate absolute and relative (to the North) beneﬁt in terms
of aggregate product and factor prices. That is apparent in equations (14), (16a)
and (16b) above, provided that the changes in mark-ups are of second order. In
fact, both the level of the composite ﬁnal good and the marginal productivity
of H and L increase with Qm,N.








comparison of (25) with the respective expression for the North — from (11)
—s h o w st h a tnS > nN. Since Northern and Southern producers have access
to the same state-of-the-art intermediate goods, diﬀerences in the structure of
ﬁnal-goods production is determined exclusively by diﬀerences in domestic labor
endowments, which imply that, under international trade, the North produces
more High-technology ﬁnal goods than the South.
Notice that, through the operation of the price channel, the nS given by
(25) is larger than in pre-trade. This is because, as discussed in 2.3 above, labor
endowments inﬂuence the direction of R&D in such a way that there are stronger
incentives to improve technological knowledge that saves the relatively scarce






Concerning the level eﬀect on wages, inter-country wage inequality (16a and
16b) falls because the technological knowledge progress embodied in internation-
ally traded intermediate goods is the same for both countries.13 The access to
more productive intermediate goods shifts upwards the demand for both types
of labor in the South. The resulting absolute (and relative to the North) beneﬁt
to both types of Southern labor is not balanced though. Indeed, the level eﬀect
reduces intra-South wage inequality (high-skilled labor premium), as shown by
plugging the technological-knowledge bias implied by the assumed relative labor
































In other words, the shift in the demand for L is more pronounced due to com-
plementarity between intermediate goods and labor, together with the Northern
technological-knowledge bias. This is a typical Stolper-Samuelson eﬀect, with
the relative wage of the relatively scarce factor (H, in the South) suﬀering with
international trade.
The level eﬀect of international trade also involves immediate changes in
the allocation of resources. In particular, the amount of Southern resources
devoted to R&D increases for two reasons. On the one hand, incentives to
imitation increase through the positive eﬀect of openness on the probability of
successful imitation (21-v, above); and, on the other hand, access to enlarged
markets requires more resources due to the adverse eﬀe c to fm a r k e ts i z eo nt h e
probability of successful imitation (21-iv, above) 14
12This is clearly in contrast with what would be predicted by the market-size channel,
through which the opposite would occur.
13However, the level eﬀect does not fully equalize wages between North and South, as long
as international immobility of labor and diﬀerences in exogenous productivity and marginal
costs remain in place.
14Resources devoted to R&D immediately increase in the North as well, but only for the
second reason, i.e.,t h ea d v e r s ee ﬀect of market size on the probability of successful innovation
(20-iv). Northern resources are reallocated at the expense of current consumption, diﬀerently
form the South - where consumption increases with the immediate increase in aggregate
income.
173.3 Equilibrium R&D
Given the functional forms (20) and (21) of the probabilities of success in R&D,
w h i c hd e p e n do nt h er e s o u r c e s—c o m p o s i t eﬁnal goods — allocated to it, free-
entry equilibrium is deﬁned by the equality between expected revenue and re-
sources spent. Taking, for example, the case of imitation, such equality takes
the form
pbS(k,j,t) VS(k,j,t)=yS(k,j,t) (28)
where VS(k,j,t) is the expected current value of the ﬂow of proﬁts to the mo-
nopolist producer of intermediate good j, or, in other words, the market value
of the patent.15
The expected ﬂow of proﬁts depends on the amount in each period, the
interest rate, and the expected duration of the ﬂow, which is the expected
duration of the imitator’s technological leadership. Such duration, in turn,
depends on the probability of a successful innovation in the North, which is the






The amount of proﬁts — ΠS —, at time t, for the monopolist producer of
intermediate good j, using an imitation of quality k, depends on the marginal
cost, the mark-up, and the world demand for intermediate good j by the ﬁnal-
goods producers. Its expression, for a High-speciﬁc j and recalling that S − N
indexes the second sequence in table 1, is
ΠH,S−N(k,j,t)=h (1 − α)α−1
qk(j,t)( 1 −α)α−1
(1 − MCS) n
HS [AS pm,S(t)]
α−1
+ HN [AN pm,N(t)]
α−1o , (30)
Plugging equation (30) into (29) and then (29) and (21) with ξS =1into (28)
and solving for pbN, the equilibrium probability of a successful innovation in a
High-speciﬁc intermediate good — given the interest rate and the price indexes
15Still in other words, V is the value of the monopolist ﬁrm, owned by domestic consumers.
16I nt h ec a s eo ft h ev a l u eo fap a t e n t e di n n o v a t i o n—VN — the challenge comes from both a
new Northern innovation and a Southern imitation — i.e.,t h eﬁrst and second cases in table
1.
18of ﬁnal goods — is
pbH,N(t)=βS ζ
−1
S BD BT f(e QH(t),d)−σ+ e QH(t) e QH(t) h
(1 − α)α−1













The equilibrium m-speciﬁc pbm,N turns out to be independent of j and k.
There are two reasons behind this independence. The ﬁrst and most substantial
one is the removal of scale of knowledge eﬀects — the positive inﬂuence of the
quality rung on proﬁts and on the learning eﬀect is exactly oﬀset by its inﬂuence
on the complexity cost — see the exponents of q in equation (30) and in equation
(21)-(ii) and (iii). The second reason is the simplifying assumption that the
determinants of imitation capacity, BD and BT in the catching-up term in
equation (21)-(v), are not speciﬁc to each intermediate good.
Additional scale eﬀects could arise through market size, as has been intensely
discussed in the R&D endogenous growth literature since Jones’ (1995) critique.
Due to the technological complementarity in the production function (1), the
size of the market for m-speciﬁci n t e r m e d i a t eg o o d si no u rm o d e li st h em-type
labor. Then, the scale eﬀect is apparent in the size of the proﬁts equation (30)
— see the labor terms within square brackets. Since we aim at understanding
international trade eﬀects other than market size, the removal of scale is in
order. The adverse eﬀect of market size due to the scale-proportional diﬃculty
of introducing new quality intermediate goods — term (iv) in equations (20) and
( 2 1 )—i sd e s i g n e dt oo ﬀset the scale eﬀect on proﬁts. With ξ =1 ,t h eo ﬀsetting
is such that the inﬂuence of market size becomes negligible, as is apparent in
expression DH in equation (31).
Since the probability of successful innovation — as a Poisson arrival rate —
determines the speed of technological knowledge progress, equilibrium can be
translated into the path of Northern technological knowledge, from which free
trade in intermediate goods allows the South to beneﬁt as well. The relationship
turns out to yield the following expression — where equation (31) is plugged in






S BD BT f(e QH(t),d)−σ+ e QH(t) e QH(t) h
(1 − α)α−1





It is clear in equation (32) that there are international trade feedback eﬀects
from imitation to innovation. That is, the positive level eﬀect from the innovator
to the imitator — the access to the state-of-the-art intermediate goods increases
production and thus the resources available to imitation R&D — feeds back into
the innovator, aﬀecting the Northern technological knowledge through creative
destruction.
Due to the technological complementarity in the production of ﬁnal goods,
t h er a t eo fg r o w t ho fm-speciﬁc technological knowledge — equation (32) for the
South and m = H — translates into the growth of demand for m-type labor
interrelated with the dynamics of the price indexes of ﬁnal and intermediate







b pm(t)+ b Qm,N(t). (33)
Thus, the path of m-wages in each country depends on the path of domestic
demand for m-type labor, which, in turn, depends on the evolution of:
(i) the domestic range of the m-technology, established by threshold n,w h i c h
determines prices of (non-tradable) ﬁnal goods;
(ii) the world demand for m-speciﬁc intermediate goods, reﬂected in inter-
national prices and driven by available technological knowledge.
3.4 Steady-state growth
Since, by assumption, both countries have the access — through free trade —
to the same state-of-the-art intermediate goods and the same technology of
production of ﬁnal goods,17 the steady-state growth rate must be the same as
well. This implies, through the Euler equation (19), that interest rates are also
equalized between countries in steady-state.
As for the sectorial growth rates, we note ﬁrst that the instantaneous aggre-
17Except for the levels of exogenous productivity, A,a n dl a b o r ,m,i np r o d u c t i o nf u n c t i o n
(1), which implies diﬀerences in the levels but not in the growth rates.
20gate resources constraint — again in country S, for example — is
YS(t)=CS(t)+XS(t)+RS(t), (34)
where
YS(t) is total resources, the composite ﬁnal good;
CS(t)=
R 1





0 xn,S(k,j,t)dndj is aggregate intermediate goods;
and RS(t)=
R 1
0 yS(k,j,t)dj is total resources spent in R&D.
In other words, the aggregate ﬁnal good is used for consumption and savings,
which in turn are allocated between production of intermediate goods and R&D.
This implies that the steady-state growth rate of each of these variables is equal
to the Northern growth rate of technological knowledge.
Since the composite ﬁnal-good production is constant returns to scale in the
inputs Qm and m — see above equation (14) —, the constant, common to both
countries, steady-state growth rate, designated by g∗,i s
b Q∗
H = b Q∗
L = b Y ∗ = b X∗ = b R∗ = b C∗ = b c∗ = θ
−1 (r∗ − ρ)=g∗, (35)
implying steady levels of threshold ﬁnal goods, ﬁnal and intermediate goods
price indexes, wage premia, and gaps in both types of technological knowledge.18
Although levels remain diﬀerent (due to international immobility of labor and
diﬀerences in exogenous productivity and marginal costs), steady-state growth
of wages is equalized between countries, as derived by plugging in constant
steady-state prices in (33), which is a Schumpeterian dynamic equivalent to the
static factor-price equalization Samuelson’s result.
Clearly, R&D drives steady-state endogenous growth. This feature is not,
however, speciﬁc to international trade. In order to look at the steady-state
eﬀects of international trade we must investigate g∗ further. To this end, we
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— obtained by setting the growth rate of consumption in (19) equal to the growth
18Indeed, while complete convergence in available technological knowledge is instantaneous
with international trade (level eﬀect), domestic levels may not converge completely, that is,
e QH and e QL may remain below one.
21rate of Northern technological knowledge in (32) — with the one that would
prevail in a pre-trade steady state.19 Taking into account that goods, assets,
as well as technological knowledge do not ﬂow internationally in autarky, the
advantage of backwardness and openness terms vanish from the probability of
successful imitation (21). The increment in the steady-state interest rate, from





















While evaluation of equation (37) requires solving for transitional dynamics
through calibration and simulation, we can, however, emphasize four ways, in
addition to the level eﬀects, through which international trade inﬂuences, in
opposite directions, steady-state growth.
The ﬁrst way in which international trade inﬂuences steady-state growth is
the positive catching-up eﬀect on the probability of successful imitation. Imita-
tion capacity increases with the degree of openness, which is captured by BT,
and the advantages of backwardness are only obtained in the presence of inter-
national trade. Through the feedback eﬀect described above, the probability of
successful innovation, and thus the steady-state growth rate, are also aﬀected —
see equations (31) and (32).
The second way is the positive spillovers from North to South. Each inno-
vation in the North tends to lower the cost of Southern imitation because the
backwardness advantage is strengthened with each improvement of the techno-
logical knowledge frontier.
The third — counteracting — channel is the monopolistic competition mark-
up. In (37) the Southern monopolist’s mark-up under international trade is
(1 − MCS), clearly less than the mark-up in the South under pre-trade, which
is (q−MCS).T h i sl o s so fp r o ﬁts also happens to the Northern monopolist: the
average mark-up between the ﬁrst and third situations in table 1 above is smaller
than (q − 1), which is the mark-up under pre-trade. The reason for this is that
in pre-trade successful researches are protected from international competition.
Once engaged in international trade and imitation becomes proﬁtable (provided
that the technological knowledge threshold d is overcome), proﬁt margins in both
North and South are reduced, which discourages R&D activities.20
19Then, g∗ results from plugging the r∗ into the Euler equation (19) or (35).
20Contrary to previous models in which the reduction of margins is oﬀs e tb ym a r k e te n l a r g e -
22The fourth — counteracting as well — way through which international trade
inﬂuences steady-state growth, is that Southern ﬁrms have to support the R&D
imitative cost of state-of-the-art intermediate goods, possibly several quality
rungs above (and thus more complex) their own experience level in pre-trade.
This is reﬂected in the presence of the technological knowledge ratio, e Q∗
H,i n
(37).
The eﬀect of trade on the steady-state growth rate is, thus, ambiguous. How-
ever, the comparative statics (numerically computed based on the calibration
in table 2, appendix) are not aﬀected by such ambiguity because the reported
changes in g∗ (the ﬁrst column of table 3, appendix) refer to steady-state growth
under trade. This rate is aﬀected by the levels of exogenous variables and para-
meters, which is to be expected in an endogenous growth model. In particular,
both countries’ exogenous levels of productivity (AN and AS) and parameters
of R&D technology (β, BD and BT) improve the common growth rate through
their positive eﬀect on the proﬁbility of R&D, as (30) and (31) demonstrate.
The impact on steady-state growth of the Southern marginal cost of ﬁnal-goods
production, MCS, results from the combination of typical Schumpeterian-R&D
eﬀects: (i) by reducing productivity, it reduces resources available to R&D, and,
consequently, both imitation and innovation (feedback eﬀect); it also implies a
smaller mark-up for the intermediate-goods producers in the South, thereby
(ii) discouraging imitative R&D and (iii) encouraging innovative R&D; in our
numerical calculations, the eﬀects (i) and (ii) clearly dominate (iii).
3.5 Transitional dynamics and steady-state eﬀects of trade
Numerical calculations describing dynamic equilibrium — which has involved
parameter calibration and sensitivity analysis based on empirical literature and
theoretical conditions, as presented in the appendix — conﬁrms that optimal
paths converge to the stable steady-state.
Moreover, the calculations uncover the price-channel eﬀects of international
trade on the dynamics of technological knowledge, relative prices and wages,
assuming the starting condition stated in (26).
ment — e.g.,R i v e r a - B a t i za n dR o m e r( 1 9 9 1 )— ,w eh a v er e m o v e dt h es c a l ee ﬀect, as explained
above.
23Technological knowledge gap
While internationally available technological knowledge, Qm,N,i st h es a m ei n
both countries, Southern technological knowledge, Qm,S, remains lower because
at each point in time, not all innovations have been imitated yet. The dis-
tance to the frontier of technological knowledge deﬁnes Southern backwardness
— the converse of each ratio e Qm. Figure 1 shows a reduction (after time zero,
when a shift to free trade of intermediate goods occurs) of this distance in both
types of technological knowledge during the transition to the steady state with
international trade.21
Domestic accumulation of technological knowledge, through R&D, depends
on the probability of success. Therefore, the reduction of the gaps must reﬂect
diﬀerentiated changes in the probabilities of successful innovation and imita-
tion. In addition to the advantage-of-backwardness eﬀect on the probability
of imitation, diﬀerentiated changes in the probabilities arise from inter-country
diﬀerences in the allocation of resources to R&D. In fact, while increasing in
both countries at rates higher than g∗ during transition, R&D resources increase
more in the South due to stronger incentives — reﬂected in higher interest rates.
Incentives remain stronger in the catching-up South as long as the eﬀect of the
fall in the cost of imitation relative to innovation prevails, i.e., during transition
after opening to international trade.
Technological-knowledge bias and wage inequality
Figures 2 through 6 show transitional dynamics to steady states, triggered by
North-South trade of intermediate goods that starts at time zero. The ﬁgures
depict the paths of threshold ﬁnal goods, relative prices of ﬁnal goods, techno-
logical knowledge bias and wage inequality, and are arranged in a suitable order
to accompany the sequence of analytical steps that follows.
Due to complementarity, the threshold ﬁnal good, n, and relative prices of
High-technology ﬁnal goods,
pH
pL , are determined by the combination of the two
types of technological knowledge with the respective labor — recall (11) and (12).
Resulting from the steady-state relationships in (35) above, such a combination
tends to a constant in each country and, consequently, so do n and
pH
pL .A s
explained above in 3.2, the access to the Northern state-of-the-art intermediate
goods, coupled with the relative scarcity of high-skilled labor in the South,
21Reduction of the gap occurs at decreasing rates because backwardness becomes less and
less advantageous towards the steady state.
24implies that relatively more Low-ﬁnal goods are produced in the South (i.e.
nS > nN), where, consequently, High-technology ﬁnal goods are relatively more
expensive — as results from (12).
Once international trade is introduced, both n and
pH
pL fall towards the
steady-state. In fact, as the time zero (under trade) North-South average rel-
ative price of High-technology ﬁnal goods is higher than the one prevailing in
pre-trade North, the price channel — discussed above in 2.3 — enhances relative
demand for High-speciﬁc new designs, biasing R&D in that direction, as shown
in ﬁgure 4. Relative to pre-trade, such bias increases the world supply of High-
speciﬁc intermediate goods, thereby increasing the number of High ﬁnal goods
and lowering their relative price in both countries.
Due to complementarity between inputs in the production of ﬁnal goods,
changes in intra-country wage inequality are closely related to the technological
knowledge bias — as (15) clearly shows. The stimulus to the demand for H —
arising from the technological bias induced by trade — increases the high-skilled
labor premium in the North, relative to what would have prevailed under pre-
trade (ﬁgure 5).
In pre-trade South, relative scarcity drives a higher H premium, which is
reduced at time zero, as explained above in 3.2 This immediate eﬀect in the level
of the relative wage of H is partially reverted in the transition to the steady state
—a sﬁgure 5 shows — due to the Northern technological knowledge bias, which,
under trade, is embodied in the intermediate goods available to the South. Once
in steady state, with a constant technological knowledge bias implied by (35),
intra-country wage inequality in both the North and South remains constant.
The wage-inequality paths in ﬁgure 5 are compatible with the trends (de-
scribed by Richardson, 1995, for example) that point to an increase in wage
inequality (in favor of high-skilled labor) in developed as well as in developing
countries. In our model, such an increase is related to the bias in technological
knowledge, which spreads from the more developed to the developing country
through international trade. However, with ﬁxed and immobile labor endow-
ments, the Stolper-Samuelson trade level eﬀect in the South, in favor of the
relatively abundant less-skilled labor, dominates the subsequent dynamic path
of increasing wage inequality.
In addition to the transition from pre-trade, analyzed above, the results of
steady-state comparative statics under trade also reﬂect the mechanisms that
closely connect the direction of technological knowledge with the path of intra-
country wage inequality. Table 3 in the appendix shows partial derivatives
25(analytically or numerically computed) of the relevant variables with respect to
exogenous variables, parameters and initial conditions, in steady-state with free
trade of intermediate goods.22
The eﬀects that exogenous changes have on technological-knowledge bias
(column 2 in table 3) and on intra-country wage inequality (columns 3 and 4,
table 3) are, thus, closely related. Take, for example, an increase in h,t h ea b -
solute productivity advantage of high-skilled labor, which can be interpreted as
the ﬁrst stage of a new general purpose technology. The increase in h not only
increases the high-skilled wage premium, but it also favors High-technology in
the production of ﬁnal goods (i.e.,t h et h r e s h o l dﬁnal good, n,f a l l s ) . C o n s e -
quently, relative demand for High-speciﬁc intermediate goods rises, enhancing,
in turn, proﬁts of High-speciﬁc R&D and thereby biasing technological knowl-
edge in that direction.
In what respects the inﬂuence of initial relative levels on the steady state,
table 3 shows that when the South is initially closer to the North in one type of
technological knowledge — higher e QH(0) or e QL(0) — the steady-state technologi-
cal knowledge becomes more biased towards that type of knowledge, relative to
the other. For example, ﬁgure 6 shows the stylized case of an increase in e QH(0),
which improves, at time zero and subsequently, the probability of successful in-
novation in High technological knowledge. The mechanism is the following:
with larger domestic High technological knowledge, each High-Southern imi-
tator faces less quality rungs to reach the state-of-the-art, thereby enhancing
High-imitation, which, in turn, feeds back, under trade, into the North (as ex-
plained above in 3.3). Then, complementarity between inputs implies that the
rising technological knowledge bias increases the high-skilled wage premium.
The eﬀects of exogenous changes in labor endowments are straightforward.
With scale eﬀects removed, the technological knowledge bias is not aﬀected, and
so an increase in the supply of one type of labor relative to the other simply
diminishes its relative wage. If, for instance, the more productive labor becomes
relatively more abundant in the North, then the wage premium of the less
productive labor increases, as implied by (15). In our context of international
immobility of labor, these changes do not extend to the South, and so inter-
country wage inequality increases in favor of the North in low-skilled labor and
in favor of the South in high-skilled labor (columns 5 and 6 of table 3).23
22Transitional dynamics is not shown, as its behavior is not qualitatively aﬀected.
23Table 3 shows that inter-country wage inequality is also straightforwardly aﬀected by
changes in a country’s exogenous productivity, and by changes in marginal cost — an increase
264C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
By considering international trade between North and South, two countries with
diﬀerent levels of development, but both capable of conducting R&D (innovative
in the North and imitative in the South), this paper connects technological
knowledge diﬀusion with the direction of technological change and, thus, relates
technological knowledge diﬀusion with the dynamics of inter and intra-country
wage inequality.
Our simulation results can be interpreted in comparison with previous lit-
erature about skill-biased technological change. In that literature, the bias
that causes wage inequality is mainly induced through the market-size channel;
whereas in our case, changes in the paths of inter and intra-country wage in-
equality result similarly from the direction of technological progress, but are,
however, induced through the price channel under international trade. In con-
trast with the market-size channel, the operation of the price-channel yields an
increase in the high-skilled technological bias following openness, which is more
in line with the recent trends observed in developed and developing countries.
With an extension of our model, allowing for simultaneous scale and price ef-
fects, future research should be able to assess the strength of the market-size
versus price channels.
Further details of the dynamics of wage-inequality following trade provide
another step for this research. Since in this paper, the relative-wage paths
hinge, among other factors, on the assumption of ﬁxed endowments, we intend
to explore the eﬀects of endogenous human capital accumulation
Finally, still another promising extension of the research follows from a re-
cent characterization, by Aghion et al. (2003), of the explanations for rising
wage inequality, stressing the importance of institutions. Our framework can
accommodate the North-South spread of exogenous innovations of the general-
purpose-technology type, which is interpretable and, thus, can be modelled as
an institutional change.
Appendix: Baseline parameter calibration and
comparative statics
Parameter calibration is based on empirical literature and theoretical conditions.
in the marginal cost in our lab-equipment model corresponds to an increase in wages.
27The ﬁnal-goods technology parameter α has two interpretations in the model
— the labor share in production, α, and the mark-up ratio, 1
1−α.I t sv a l u ei ss e t
accordingly, in line with the mark-up estimates of Kwan and Lai (2003).
T h eb a s e l i n ev a l u ef o rθ is in line with previous calibrations of growth models,
where it is assumed to exceed one — e.g.,J o n e set al. (1993). The annualized
rate of time preference, ρ, also follows from previous works on growth — e.g.,
Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999).
The other parameters have been calibrated taking into account our theoret-
ical assumptions and considering a pre-trade Northern steady-state growth rate
of 2%, which approximately matches the average per capita growth rate of the
U.S. over the post-war period, as pointed out by Jones (1995b).
Parameter Value Parameter Value Parameter Value
AN 1.75 βN 1.60 BT 1.85
AS 1.00 βS 1.00 σ 0.60
α 0.60 ζN 4.00 d 0.10
h 1.20 ζS 2.50 θ 1.05
MCS 0.60 BD 1.28 ρ 0.03












∂AN + ≈ 0 ≈ 0 ≈ 0 − −
∂AS + ≈ 0 ≈ 0 ≈ 0 + +
∂h + + + + ≈ 0 ≈ 0
∂MCS − ≈ 0 ≈ 0 ≈ 0 + +
∂βS + ≈ 0 ≈ 0 ≈ 0 ≈ 0 ≈ 0
∂βN + ≈ 0 ≈ 0 ≈ 0 ≈ 0 ≈ 0
∂BD + ≈ 0 ≈ 0 ≈ 0 ≈ 0 ≈ 0
∂BT + ≈ 0 ≈ 0 ≈ 0 ≈ 0 ≈ 0
∂ HN
LN ≈ 0 ≈ 0 − ≈ 0 + −
∂ HS
LS ≈ 0 ≈ 0 ≈ 0 − − +
∂ e QH (0) ≈ 0 + + + ≈ 0 ≈ 0
∂ e QL (0) ≈ 0 − − − ≈ 0 ≈ 0
Note: ≈ 0 indicates a second-order negligible change
Table 3: Steady-state comparative statics under trade
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Figure 3: Relative price of High ﬁnal goods
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Figure 4: Relative productivity of High technological knowledge
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Figure 5: Intra-country wage inequality — high-skilled labor premium
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Figure 6: Changes in the path of technological knowledge bias
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